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This Article focuses on the regulatory use of finance theory, particularly
the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"), in two areas where securities
pricing is at issue: shareholder appraisal cases and the use of employer
stock in benefit plans. Regarding shareholder appraisal cases, the Article
finds that the Delaware courts seem to implicitly respect the principles of
EMH when ascertaining the fair value of stock, but recognize that markets
cannot operate efficiently if information is withheld. Regarding employer
stock in benefit plans, it concentrates on the explicit adoption of EMH by the
Department of Labor to exempt directed trustees from traditional duties of
inquiry regarding the prudence of investment directions.
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As scholars in employee benefits and corporate governance, our interest
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX")' is in asking what insights its enact-
ment, motivating principles, and substantive provisions provide for these
fields. In some ways the intersections are obvious. In past work we have
considered how securities law, state corporate law, and federal employee-
benefits law differ in setting standards for directors' conduct and have ex-
amined directors' loyalty obligations in the context of company stock
transactions.3 Other commentators have expressed a variety of views on the
intersection between federal regulation under SOX and the traditional realm
of state corporate governance law.
Professor Roberta Romano has argued that SOX's substantive corporate
governance mandates conflict with the empirical finance literature's findings
on what constitutes effective regulation. In this Article we focus on the
regulatory use of finance theory, particularly the efficient market hypothesis
("EMH"),6 in two related areas where securities pricing is at issue: share-
holder appraisal cases and the use of employer stock in company-sponsored
employee investment plans . For a substantial time it seemed that the gen-
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and other chapters).
2. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, New Standards of Director Loyalty and Care in the
Post-Enron Era: Are Some Shareholders More Equal Than Others?, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 279 (2004-2005).
3. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions for
Directors'Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 437 (2006).
4. Compare William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small
State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (reflecting on the marked increase in federal involvement), and
Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Prnmise of Enhanced Per-
sonal Accountability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (raising the
possibility that SOX's personal certification requirement may be largely symbolic), with Robert B.
Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 721
(2005) (proposing a system of mixed state and national governance), and Margo Eberlein, Recover-
ing Retirement Security: An Analysis of the Lockdown Claims Under ERISA, as Illustrated by the
Enron Litigation, 79 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 699, 710 (2004) (implying SOX will be effective in pro-
tecting employees in lockdown situations).
5. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527-1529 (2005); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After
Three Years, 2005 N.Z. L. REv. 365.
6. For a definition of efficient market hypothesis, see Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internaliz-
ing Outsider Trading, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 313, n.18 (2002) ("Several versions of the efficient market
hypothesis exist. The strong form of the hypothesis holds that all information, whether public or
nonpublic, is incorporated in the secondary market securities price. The semistrong version of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis in turn posits that the secondary market price of companies
reflects all publicly available information on the company. In contrast, the weak form of market
efficiency posits only that the market price reflects all prior price information.").
7. By this term we generally intend to encompass both 401(k) plans and employee stock
ownership plans. For our reasons for adopting this term, see Muir & Schipani, supra note 2, at 324-
26.
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eral trend in legal and finance literature was to accept some form of EMH.8
EMH's acceptance in jurisprudence accelerated after the Supreme Court
effectively adopted it for purposes of securities-fraud claims in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson9 in 1988. More recently, though, EMH has met increasing skepti-
cism in financial theory due to research in areas such as noise trading,'0
market bubbles,' and behavioral finance. 2 Although the legal scholarship
has remained current with this debate, 3 arguably much jurisprudence and
policy-making in state corporate law and in federal employee-benefits law
has remained loyal to basic EMH principles.'
4
In this Article we begin, in Part I, by examining the use of EMH in
shareholder appraisal cases. In that Part, we find that the Delaware courts
seem to respect the principles of EMH implicitly when ascertaining the fair
value of stock, but they also recognize that markets cannot operate effi-
ciently if information is withheld. In addition, the courts' analyses of the
concurrent fiduciary duty claims brought in some of these cases seem to
reflect a tacit judicial belief that shareholders are entitled to full information.
The courts more closely scrutinize transactions involving conflicts of inter-
est due, at least in part, to concerns that the shareholders might not have
received full information. In Part II we analyze EMH as it relates to the use
of employer stock in company-sponsored employee investment plans. The
focus is on the explicit adoption of EMH by the Department of Labor
("DOL") to exempt directed trustees from historic duties of inquiry regard-
ing the prudence of investment directions. This offers the opportunity to
consider the opposite side of Professor Romano's critique of substantive
provisions of SOX-how well or poorly policy-makers do when they pur-
port to rely on principles developed in finance research.
Although securities law scholars take a variety of positions on the ro-
bustness of market-efficiency theory and the extent to which federal
legislation should intervene in favor of capital market efficiency, all seem to
agree that markets benefit from sufficient and accurate information.'- Simi-
larly, it appears that increased reliability of information transmission to the
market was Congress's intent in enacting SOX, regardless of whether scholars
8. See, e.g., Eugene E Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
9. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
10. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 143 (2002).
11. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000).
12. See Langevoort, supra note 10. at 143-47.
13. See, e.g., id. (analyzing securities law issues from the perspective of behavioral finance).
14. See infra Parts I & II.
15. See Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451,463 (1995) ("Few scholars would
suggest that information is irrelevant in the development of market price.").
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view it as a positive step in that direction.16 Our inquiry finds that the Dela-
ware courts and legislature believe that informational problems can
necessitate fact-specific analyses of whether market price reflects fair value.
In contrast, the DOL purports to believe, almost without exception, in the
efficiency of markets for all publicly traded securities and that efficient pric-
ing is sufficient to establish investment prudence.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
In deciding cases involving stock price valuations, the Delaware courts
seem more concerned than the DOL 7 with the possibility that the markets
may be unable to price shares fairly. The courts thus seem somewhat more
skeptical of reliance on the market price, and the EMH, for the fair valuation
of stock. At least one visible concern of the courts is the availability of ma-
terial information in the market. The courts recognize that without full
information, the market, in a particular instance, may be unable to price
shares fairly.
A. Statutory Appraisal Actions
One area where the EMH is implicated in this way, at least implicitly, is
in the Delaware jurisprudence on shareholder statutory appraisal actions. In
these actions, minority shareholders claim that they have not received fair
value for their shares given up in a merger or consolidation. Under these
circumstances, the minority shareholders may seek judicial determination of
the fair price of their shares."
The EMH appears to underlie the defense in these actions. The defen-
dants often argue that the buyout price is fair to the extent it reflects the
market price of the stock. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs dispute this contention
and question the market price as the appropriate benchmark for assessing
the fair value of the shares. We recognize that valuation is a rather complex
topic' 9 and we do not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of the valua-
tion approaches used by the Delaware courts in appraisal actions or the
surrounding controversies. Rather, in this Section, we review selected Dela-
16. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address at the Signing of H.R.
3763, The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/07/20020730.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006)("The only risks, the only fair risks are based on
honest information.").
17. See infra Part I1.
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001).
19. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can
Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 359 (1996) (criticizing the current state of the law in Delaware regarding transfers of control);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
785 (2003) (discussing doctrinal anomalies in the freeze-out jurisprudence).
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ware cases that demonstrate the subtle role the EMH plays in the valuation
analysis.20
According to Delaware General Corporate Law, stockholders of Dela-
ware corporations are entitled to statutory appraisal of their shares when the
shares of stock are held through the effective date of a merger or consolida-
tion, provided that certain procedures have been followed. 2 , The statute
denies appraisal rights to shares traded on a national exchange, thus implic-
itly, it seems, respecting the EMH. This exclusion, however, does not apply
if the shareholders are required to accept cash rather than stock or deposi-
22tory receipts for their shares in the merger or consolidation. Thus,
shareholders who are frozen out of the corporation and forced to accept cash
for their shares are entitled to appraisal rights, even if the shares of the com-
pany were traded on a national exchange."
In the appraisal action, the court must determine the "fair value" of the
corporation that issued the stock. The dissenting shareholder is then entitled
to his or her "proportionate interest in [the corporation as) a going concern ' 25
without application of a minority discount.26 Thus, the court's "task in an ap-
praisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder."27 A
crucial question in this analysis is how much weight, if any, should be given to
the market value of the corporation's stock in the valuation."
When the market for a publicly traded security is active and efficient, the
market price of the corporation's common stock is important corroborative
evidence of value.2 According to the EMH (in semi-strong form),3° financial
20. Appraisal statutes, and the corresponding judicial interpretation of those statutes, vary
across jurisdictions. We focus on the Delaware statute and case law due to the preeminence of
Delaware as the state of incorporation for the majority of publicly traded companies. See Demetrios
G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL J. CORP L. 965, 1011 (1995)
("Delaware remains the preeminent state of incorporation"); see also Harriet Smith Windsor, Dela-
ware Secretary of State, Secretary's Letter: Greetings from the Secretary of State,
http://www.state.de.us/corp/corpsosbio.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) ("More than half a million
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-
traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500.").
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2001).
22. Id. § 262(b)(2).
23. Id. This, of course, assumes that the statutory process for perfecting approval rights was
followed.
24. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor IV), 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del.
1996); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415,2004 WL 1305745, at *9
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001).
25. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,72 (Del. 1950).
26. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989).
27. Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
28. See In re Emerging Commc'ns., 2004 WL 1305745, at *23.
29. Id.
30. The semi-strong form of the EMH is only one of three forms of the theory. In weak-
form,, the hypothesis asserts that all past market prices and data are fully reflected in the price of
securities. In strong-form, the hypothesis asserts that all information is fully reflected in the price of
securities, including insider information. See generally Fama, supra note 8.
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markets are efficient, and thus all public information is calculated into a
stock's current share price such that securities prices reflect all known in-
formation." If courts were confident that the markets are operating
efficiently, it would be reasonable to expect courts to give stronger prefer-
ence to the market price of a corporation's stock in a stock appraisal action.
However, although they respect the capital markets and consider market
price a factor to be weighed in the analysis, the Delaware courts acknowl-
edge that market prices do not necessarily reflect the fair value of the
stock,3 2 even when the stock is traded on a national market.
One of the earlier cases in Delaware evidencing skepticism with respect
to market price as a proxy for valuation in appraisal proceedings is Chicago
Corp. v. Munds.33 The Munds court decided the issues pursuant to an earlier
version of the appraisal statute. In Munds, the court observed that "[t]he
experience of recent years is enough to convince the most casual observer
that the market in its appraisal of values must have been woefully wrong in
its estimates at one time or another .... Markets are known to gyrate in a
single day. '34 The Munds court further noted that market value "undoubtedly
is a pertinent consideration," but not exclusive.35 Munds was decided in
1934, on the heels of the Great Depression, and at the onset of federal regu-
36lation of securities. Thus, given the time frame of the decision, it is not
difficult to understand the concerns the court expressed about market value.
The Delaware Supreme Court set the parameters of modem valuation
analysis in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.3 7 The Weinberger court stated that stock
valuation proceedings "must include proof of value by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial commu-
nity and otherwise admissible in court. ' '38 As a result, this case is currently
cited for the proposition that the Chancery Court has wide discretion to de-
termine the most appropriate financial model to use to when calculating the
31. See generally Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J.
EcON. PERSP. 59 (2003).
32. E.g., Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298-99; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713
(Del. 1983); In re Emerging Commc'ns., 2004 WL 1305745, at *9; Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A.
452, 457 (Del. Ch. 1934).
33. Munds, 172 A. 452.
34. Id. at 455.
35. Id. at 457.
36. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006)).
37. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
38. Id. at 713.
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fair value of shares in any given case. 9 Although market value is one factor
that must be considered in the analysis, it is not dispositive. °
The court in In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litiga-
tion,4 ' had occasion to apply the Weinberger analysis. In Emerging
Communications, plaintiffs filed a statutory appraisal action, combined with
a class action for breach of fiduciary duty, after the majority stockholder in
Emerging Communications, Inc. ("ECM") acquired its publicly owned
shares to take the company private.4 3 The former public stockholders of
ECM claimed that the privatization "was the product of unfair dealing that,
in turn, resulted in an unfair transaction price."" Defendants' expert coun-
tered that ECM was traded in an efficient market and that the market price
of ECM common stock prior to the buyout was a reasonable reflection of its
value. On this issue, the court sided with plaintiffs.46 ECM had been trad-
ing on the American Stock Exchange. 7
Although not discussing the EMH, the Emerging Communications court
noted that under Delaware law market price is not always indicative of true
value, although it is evidence to be considered. 4 According to the court, the
record undermined any assertion that ECM was traded in an efficient mar-
ket49 It appears that the court was concerned that the market for these shares
could not function efficiently, and therefore could not price the shares accu-
rately, because information was withheld from it.5 ° First, the court found
ECM's shares to be artificially depressed because the market was not edu-
cated about salient features of the business. The market appeared to view the
company as a developing third-world telephone company when in fact it had
the attributes of a U.S. telephone company.5 ' Rather than attempt to educate
the market, ECM's chairman and CEO exploited this misinformation and set
39. E.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor IV), 684 A.2d 289, 296-97 (Del.
1996); In re United States Cellular Operating Co., No. 18696-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS I, at *37-
38 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005); Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., No. 17802, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 131, at *41-42 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004).
40. Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 297; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713; In re Emerging
Commc'ns. Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A.16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *23 (Del. Ch. May 3,
2004, revised June 4 2004).
41. Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745.
42. Id. at *9-10.
43. Id. at*l.
44. Id. at *9.
45. Id. at *23.
46. Id.
47. Emerging Commc'ns., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM 14A), at 5 (Sept.
28, 1998).
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the privatization at an unfair price." It was precisely because the stock mar-
ket price did not reflect ECM's underlying value that an earlier proposal for
a merger transaction was abandoned and, instead, the chairman and CEO
effectively acquired the minority interest in privatization."
In addition, the court noted that before the announcement of the privati-
zation proposal, and while the stock was trading freely, the market had
neither the benefit of disclosed earnings nor the most recent projections of
future results.4 These projections were deliberately withheld from the mar-
ket.5 Based in large part on the lack of information afforded the market, the
court found that the market did not price the stock fairly. The court thus held
that the market price for the stock merited "little or no weight" in its valua-
56tion analysis. Furthermore, because the majority interest was not for sale,




The Emerging Communications court considered the analysis of the
Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
IV)-" in rendering its decision. In Technicolor IV, a minority shareholder
similarly dissented from a cash-out merger and brought a statutory appraisal
proceeding.' 9 One issue raised was whether the market price of the com-
pany's stock could be relied upon as evidence of fair value. 60 The court
briefly stated that "market price of shares may not be representative of true
value" 6' and that "[i]nformation and insight not communicated to the market
may not be reflected in stock prices. 62 Without forming an opinion, the
court allowed the party to argue that the stock market price at the time was
63of little significance to the issue of fair value. The court then remanded the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *23.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *23
57. Id. The issue of whether courts should consider the "minority discount" is a topic of
much debate. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 19.
58. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). This case is the fourth of six
appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court so far in this line of cases. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. (Technicolor 1), 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II),
634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
(Technicolor 111), 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor IV), 684
A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor V), 758 A.2d 485 (Del. 2000);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor VI), 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
59. Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 290.
60. Id. at 301.
61. Id. (quoting Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc.(In re Time Inc. S'holders Litig.),
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1989)). The Delaware Chancery court recently reiterated a concern
about relying on the fairness of market value, particularly when the stock is traded in an illiquid
market. See Gesoff v. IC Indus., Inc., Nos. 19473 & 19600, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91 (May 18,
2006).
62. Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 301 (quoting Technicolor 1, 542 A.2d at 1187 n.8).
63. Id.
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case to the Court of Chancery to determine the fair value of the stock.64 In a
later remand,65 the Chancery Court underwent a rather complex valuation
analysis and used market prices as a way to validate its analysis.
66
It follows then that the Technicolor courts were at least implicitly recog-
nizing that markets will react to available information. 6 Although these
courts considered market value in the analysis, they did not rely on it alone.
Instead, they recognized that further analysis was needed, particularly where
information may not have been communicated to the market.
The case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.6, adds an in-
teresting dimension to this issue and was cited by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Technicolor IV,69 although it was not a case concerning a statutory
appraisal action. Paramount involved an attempt to enjoin a corporation
from concluding a merger. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that market
value is not always representative of true value.7' According to Paramount,
"a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is
not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term,
even in the context of a takeover.' 72 In a footnote the court also stated that "it
is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock mar-
ket price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may
indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock.
' 73
The discussion of market value in Paramount arose because the plain-
tiffs claimed that the board of directors of Time had breached their fiduciary
duties by failing to permit the shareholders to accept Paramount's hostile
takeover offer at a price substantially higher than the price at which the
market was valuing the shares of the company.74 The plaintiffs argued that
the directors had a fiduciary obligation to secure the best price for the share-
holders.75 The court was not convinced that the market price of the shares
represented the true value of the company and left it to the directors'
64. Id. at 302.
65. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218 at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31,
2003, revised July 9, 2004), modified, Technicolor VI, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). The Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed on the issues concerning the discount rate and prejudgment interest.
66. See id. at *44.
67. See also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *31 (Del. Ch. Oct.
19, 1990), wherein the court noted that the traded security "must always be evaluated to ascertain
the degree of weight it deserves in an appraisal ' The court then considered "market price data not as
an independent source of valuation but as corroboration." Id.
68. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
69. 684 A.2d at 301.
70. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1141-42.
71. Id. at 1150.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1150 n.12.
74. Id. at 1149.
75. Id.
Beyond SOX 1949June 2007]
Michigan Law Review
business judgment to determine the most appropriate course of action.76
Again, this case evidences recognition by the courts that the markets may
not have all the information necessary to assess the long-term prospects of
the company. The courts' deference to the business judgment of the officers
and directors regarding whether to proceed with the transaction shows judi-
cial recognition that officers and directors may be better informed than the
market.
77
The Emerging Communications78 court also cited two earlier Delaware
Chancery Court decisions in support of its conclusion that market price is
not always indicative of fair value-Rapid American Corp. v. Harris9 and
In re the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.s Rapid-American involved a merger
between two companies and a statutory appraisal action to challenge the
merger price of the shares." The primary issue was whether the Chancery
Court's exclusion of a control premium in its valuation analysis constituted
error.82 The Delaware Supreme Court found it was error not to consider the
control premium and remanded the case to the Chancery Court.83 In so hold-
ing, the Rapid-American court, citing Weinbergers and Munds,85 stated that
the "trial court's rejection of the 'control premium' implicitly placed a dis-
,,86proportionate emphasis on pure market value." Further noting the
continuing relevance of the analysis of the Munds court, Rapid-American
also found that "[r]ecent price changes in the stock market dramatically il-
lustrate the defects of an overstated reliance on market price to determine a
corporation's intrinsic value in an appraisal proceeding.87
76. Id. at 1150.
77. This decision has been criticized, however. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Paramount: The
Mixed Merits of Mush, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 33 (1992) (arguing that Paramount rejected prece-
dent and lacked clarity); Marc 1. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture
Horror Show, 16 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 31-32 (1991) (arguing that Paramount is a "poorly reasoned
opinion" that "neglects legitimate shareholder interests"); E. Ashton Johnston, Note, Defenders of
the Corporate Bastion in the Revlon Zone: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 40 CATH.
U. L. REV. 155, 158 (1990) (arguing that the "new expansive reading of director discretion harms
shareholders' interests").
78. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig. No. Civ. A. 16145, 2004 WL 1305745
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004).
79. Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
80. In re the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 WL 201390 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11,
1990), aff'd, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
81. Rapid-American, 603 A.2d at 798.
82. Id. at 798-99.
83. Id. at 807.
84. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983).
85. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452,456 (Del. Ch. 1934).
86. Rapid-American, 603 A.2d at 806-07 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13; Munds,
172 A. at 456).
87. Id. at 806.
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In Shell, minority shareholders also sought an appraisal of the fair value
of their shares of stock when the company went private . Prior to the
merger, Shell had been a publicly traded company.8 9 Although the market
price at the relevant time period had been trading in the $43-$45 range, the
lower court found a fair value of $71.20.9o Shell appealed, arguing that the
valuation analysis conducted by the Chancery Court was improper on a
number of fronts. Of interest to us is Shell's argument that the trial court
erred by not giving any weight in its analysis to the trading value of Shell's
stock.9' The Delaware Supreme Court noted that the Chancery Court found
the result of the trading analysis conducted by Shell's expert, Morgan
Stanley, to be "highly illogical" and less valid than other analyses pre-
sented.92 The Delaware Supreme Court deferred to the judgment of the
Chancery Court regarding which validation experts had presented more ob-
jective evidence, expressing dismay at the lack of objectivity of all the
experts.93
On the other hand, there have been situations in which the Delaware
courts relied primarily on the market price in a valuation context. The case
of Union Illinois 1995 Investment Limited Partnership v. Union Financial
Group, Ltd.94 is illustrative. In this case, the court stated that "our case law
recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a company, the
resulting market price is reliable evidence of fair value."95 Union Illinois
involved the appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders resulting from the
96 97
sale of the company by auction. The company was not publicly held. In
its analysis, it was important to the Union Illinois court that the transaction
being evaluated was not a squeeze-out merger where the only buyer was the
parent company.98 Instead, this company was sold in an auction "conducted
fairly and openly."9 In its valuation analysis, the court gave 100% weight to
the auction preceding the execution of the merger agreement, as "the most
88. In re the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 WL 201390, at * 1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11,
1990), aff'd, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
89. In re the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Del. 1992).
90. Id. at 1215,1217.
91. Id. at 1220.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1218. The Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion
when it assigned no weight to the minority shareholders' expert argument that "the stock of inte-
grated oil companies typically trade in the stock market at substantial discounts from their intrinsic
value, and when an integrated oil and gas company, like Shell, is sold in the deal market, it typically
has commanded a large premium over its stock market price." Shell Oil Co., 1990 WL 201390, at
"14.
94. Union I11. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A,2d 340 (Del. Ch. 2004).
95. Id. at 357.
96. Id. at 342.
97. Id. at 343.
98. Id. at 350.
99. Id. at 358.
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reliable evidence of fair value."''m The court was able to do so because there
was no evidence that the board or its investment banker did anything other
than seek the highest possible value for the company.'0' The court further
noted that "the sales process was an effective one that involved the provision
of confidential information to numerous potential buyers."'0 2 Thus, this case
was unlike the minority freeze-out cases discussed above where the courts
were concerned about information being withheld from the market. Here,
the information was readily provided to the bidders in an efficient auction,
and therefore the market price reflected fair value. '°3
These cases demonstrate that the Delaware courts deciding statutory ap-
praisal claims appear to implicitly give credence to the semi-strong form of
the EMH.'°4 These courts also seem to recognize that markets can only oper-
ate efficiently with full information. Furthermore, the courts find that in the
context of some statutory appraisal actions, particularly in those actions
where the majority shareholder squeezes out the minority, the markets are
often not afforded all necessary information. Market price is thus one factor
to be weighed in determining fair value, and the weight market value should
be given depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Of particular
concern is the extent to which information may be withheld from the mar-
ket.
This point is also demonstrated by the provision of the appraisal statute
that prevents minority shareholders from seeking the appraisal remedy when
in the merger or consolidation they receive shares that are traded on a na-
tional securities exchange. °5 This is logical because these shareholders are
100. Id. at 357.
101. Id. at 343.
102. Id. The court pegged its award to the price resulting from the auction, adjusted to sub-
tract synergies. Id.
103. See also, e.g., Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002); Prescott Group
Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., Inc., No. 17802, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (2004). In Applebaum,
the court considered valuation issues in the context of a reverse-forward stock split, where the cor-
poration planned to buy back fractions of shares from minority shareholders. Applebaum, 812 A.2d
at 882-83. Pursuant to section 155(2) of the Delaware Code, these shareholders are entitled to "fair
value" of their fractional shares. Id. at 889. Similarly, in Prescott, the court found that "the most
reliable and persuasive evidence of... fair value at the time of the ... front-end merger, [was] the
value of the consideration that was negotiated at arm's length." Prescott, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131,
at * 117. The transaction in Prescott involved a two-part going private merger of The Coleman Com-
pany, Inc. into its parent company, Sunbeam. The issue was complicated by a nearly two year delay
before completion of the second step of the transaction due to fraud discovered in Sunbeam's earn-
ings statements. Id. at *2.
104. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields
in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 133 (2005) ("The law's rejection of public market
prices should not be viewed as a wholesale rejection of efficient market theory."). But see David J.
Ratway, Delaware's Stock Market Exception to Appraisal Rights: Dissenting Minority Stockholders
of Warner Communications, Inc. Are "Market-Out" of Luck, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 179, 216 (1996)
("Delaware's 'market-out' exception to appraisal rights is in direct conflict with the courts' general
skepticism of using market price as the only measure of value.").
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2001). See also Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 890 n.29
(noting the market exception to the Delaware appraisal statute); Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note
104, at 133 (noting that the market-out exception is a significant limitation to the appraisal remedy).
1952 [Vol. 105:1941
Beyond SOX
permitted to invest in the ongoing enterprise, thus they are not "squeezed
out." They are given the choice of either accepting the investment in the new
enterprise together with the majority, or selling their shares in the open mar-
ket. '06 Thus, there is no inherent concern about market valuation and hence
no appraisal remedy. Any remedy afforded to the minority will depend on
whether there was evidence of breach of fiduciary duties. A brief analysis of
potential fiduciary duty claims follows.
B. Fiduciary Duties
The information asymmetries the courts have highlighted in minority
freeze-out cases stem from the conflicts of interest inherent in these transac-
tions. Due to the nature of the transaction, the majority shareholders are in a
position to use information that is not publicly available to take advantage of
the minority interest. This scenario presents the potential for a breach of
fiduciary duty.
When examining claims of fiduciary duty breaches, corporate law has
attempted to strike a balance between respecting the business decisions of
corporate fiduciaries and recognizing that there are situations where deci-
sions should be closely scrutinized. When there is no evidence of breach of
the duty of loyalty, and where it appears that all reasonably available infor-
mation was considered in the decision-making process, the courts presume
that the decision was made in good faith and in the best interest of the cor-
poration. 07 Where this presumption-commonly known as the business
judgment rule-applies, courts will evaluate the decision-making process,
but not the substance of the decision, to determine whether there has been a
breach of the duty of care. °8 If the allegations, however, include claims of
conflicts of interest-thus implicating the duty of loyalty-or lack of good
faith, the courts will not hesitate to employ a higher level of scrutiny to
evaluate the decision.1°9
The Delaware courts' application of the business judgment rule thus
seems consistent with general acceptance of the EMH. Absent a reason to
doubt the presumption, the courts do not second-guess the good faith
106. See, e.g., Klotz v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 674 A.2d 878, 882 (Del. 1995).
107. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-73 (Del. 1995); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-
53 (Del. Ch. 1996). Also, see generally Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the
Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IowA L. REV. 1 (1989), for a discussion of Van
Gorkom, the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
108. See generally Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994) (reviewing justifications
for the business judgment rule); Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Dela-
ware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971 (1994) (tracing the development of the duty
of care in Delaware). See also E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1405 (2005).
109. See, e.g., Continuing Creditors' Comm. of Star Telecomms. Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F
Supp. 2d 449, 460 (D. Del. 2004); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502-03 (Del. Ch.
2000); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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business decisions made by the board and shareholders have no right to
complain. Instead, if shareholders are unhappy with the decision, they can
employ the market and sell their shares."0
Similarly, the provision in Delaware law that permits corporations to in-
clude a provision in the articles of incorporation limiting or eliminating
monetary liability of their directors for fiduciary duty breaches is also con-
sistent with an inherent belief that the EMH works when markets are
provided with information and interests are not conflicted. Although Section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code allows for exculpation of directors, excul-
pation is not available where breach of the duty of loyalty, lack of good
faith, or intentional misconduct are implicated."'
This provision was enacted by the Delaware legislature in the aftermath
of Smith v. Van Gorkom.' In Van Gorkom, the directors were found to be
grossly negligent when they recommended a merger to the shareholders
without ascertaining the true intrinsic value of the firm."' The directors were
held to be personally liable for damages. The case was remanded to the
Delaware Chancery Court for a determination of damages," 4 but settled in
the interim. Approximately eighteen months later, the Delaware legislature
enacted Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code to permit corporations to
provide exculpation for directors for breach of the duty of care."5 But, as
noted above, directors are excluded from exculpation for acts not in good
faith or in breach of the duty of loyalty.
Thus the Delaware legislature recognized that, to the extent that share-
holders wished to exonerate their directors for breach of the duty of care,
they should be permitted to do so. Inherently, market forces would be at
play, and regulation that imposed personal liability on directors for negli-
gence, or even gross negligence, would not be needed. However, the
legislature also implicitly recognized that market forces could not be relied
upon if the directors are conflicted, breach their duties intentionally, or fail
to act in good faith. No exculpation is available for these behaviors. This
110. E.g., Arkes & Schipani, supra note 108, at 629. Of course, it is more difficult for share-
holders to sell their shares if there is no market for the shares, or if they are restricted from sale. In
such cases, where there are egregious concerns, shareholders may attempt to pursue claims under
minority oppression statutes and case law. See Adam Chemichaw, Oppressed Shareholders in Close
Corporations: A Market-Oriented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 501, 508-09 (1994). But
see Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an
Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 251 n.255 (1997) (stating that Delaware
"fail[s] to provide the remedy of involuntary judicial dissolution for oppression of minority share-
holders of any type of corporation").
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
112. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See Bradley & Schipani, supra note
107, at 36-43, for a detailed discussion of this case. See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty
Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom: An Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of Corporate Directors
and the Role of Shareholder Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 286 (2006).
113. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874, 893.
114. Id. at 893.
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). This statute was adopted in June, 1986. Van
Gorkom was decided in January 1985.
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again seems consistent with our premise that conflicted situations, that is,
those that raise duty-of-loyalty concerns, pose a more serious threat that
information may be withheld from the market, and markets cannot operate
efficiently in this context.
Briefly, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires corporate officers and di-
rectors to put corporate interests ahead of personal interests and thus refrain
from using their positions in the corporation for their own benefit. 1' 6 Accord-
ing to the early Delaware case of Guth v. Loft," 7 a director is obligated to
"affirmatively ... protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge.""' 8 Further, "[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to
use their position of trust and confidence to further their private inter-
ests.... The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest." ''9
But even in the context of a conflicted transaction, the courts are still
willing to defer to the business judgment of the board, provided that the
conflict has been disclosed and the transaction has been approved by disin-
terested directors. 2 If a claim is made that a transaction presented a conflict
of interest, and if the transaction was not approved by a disinterested board,
the court will heighten the scrutiny of the transaction and undertake a sub-
stantive evaluation to determine whether it was entirely fair to the
corporation and the shareholders. The entire fairness standard is one of the
highest levels of scrutiny applied by the Delaware courts.
The statutory appraisal cases involving minority freeze outs are often in-
tertwined with allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. That is, shareholders
who claim receipt of an unfair price for their shares often also claim that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties by accepting the unfair price.122 In
Delaware, the courts examine these fiduciary claims substantively against
the heightened entire fairness standard.1
116. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956
(Del. 1994) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)); see also Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). See Muir & Schipani, supra note 3, for
further discussion of the duty of loyalty in general.
117. Guth, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id.; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
113, at * 163-64 (Aug. 9, 2005), aff'd No. 411, 2005, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307 (June 8, 2006) (quoting
Guth, 5 A.2d at 510).
120. Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 225 n.21 (Del. 1999); Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d
557, 562 (Del. 1999); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445,466 (Del. 1991).
121. Stegemeier, 728 A.2d at 562; Oberly, 592 A.2d at 466; see also President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll. v. Glancy, No. 18790, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25, at *69 (Mar. 21, 2003).
122. See, e.g., M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004).
123. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 (Del. 2001).
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In cases where the majority shareholders have frozen out the minority
shareholders in a merger or consolidation, the defendants have the burden of
proving that the transaction was fair, unless the transaction was approved by
independent members of the board or by a majority vote of the minority
shareholders. 2 4 But even when there is purported approval by an independ-
ent committee of the board or by the minority shareholder vote, the burden
of proving fairness remains on the majority if the independent members of
the board or the minority shareholders were not given full information prior
to their vote.' 5 In assessing the entire fairness of a transaction, "the court
must consider the process itself that the board followed, the quality of the
result it achieved and the quality of the disclosures made to the shareholders
to allow them to exercise such choice as the circumstances could provide.' 2 6
In addition to their statutory appraisal claim, the plaintiffs in Emerging
Communications,127 discussed in the previous Section, alleged breach of fi-
duciary duty. This allegation triggered a fair dealing analysis. The court first
determined that the burden remained on the defendants to prove that the
transaction was entirely fair because the votes of the purportedly independ-
ent special committee and minority shareholders were not fully informed. '2
The court reviewed all relevant aspects of the transaction, including the tim-
ing and structure of the transaction, how it was negotiated, and how director
and shareholder approval were obtained. 29The court's review of these fac-
tors led it to conclude that the privatization transaction was not entirely
fair.' 30 The court found the transaction unfair in how it was initiated, struc-
tured, and timed. "'The transaction was timed to take place when the stock
price was artificially low.1
Recently, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed claims for both statu-
tory appraisal and breach of fiduciary duty in Delaware Open MRI
Radiology Associates v. Kessler. '3 The company involved in Delaware Ra-
diology was a small, nonpublic company. 34 In discussing the claims for
124. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994); Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Del. Ch. 1994).
125. See, e.g., In re Tele-Commc'ns., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16470, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
206, at *33 (Dec. 21, 2005); In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at * 111-15.
126. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1140.
127. In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at * 1. See supra notes 41-57 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the statutory appraisal claim. Appraisal is the only remedy when a
freeze out is accomplished via a short-form merger or a tender offer followed by a short-form
merger. See Peter V. Letsou & Steven M. Haas, The Dilemma that Should Never Have Been: Minor-
ity Freeze Outs in Delaware, 61 Bus. LAW. 25 (2005).
128. In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at *30-32.
129. Id. at *32 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985)).
130. Id. at*32-38.
131. Id. at*32-33.
132. Id. at *32.
133. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290 (Del. Ch. 2006).
134. See id. at 299.
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breach of fiduciary duty, the court reaffirmed application of the entire fair-
ness standard in cases where it is alleged that conflicted fiduciaries breached
their duties.3 The court noted that the burden was on the majority group--
the defendant-to prove that the merger was entirely fair. 36 The burden
would have shifted back to the minority group-the plaintiffs-to prove the
transaction was unfair if the merger had been approved by a committee of
disinterested, independent directors, or by a majority vote of the minority
stockholders. 37 In this case, there was neither approval of the transaction by
an independent board committee nor a vote of the majority of the minority
shareholders, and thus the burden did not shift. The court then evaluated all
aspects of the transaction to determine whether the conflicted merger was
"both procedurally and substantively fair."'
38
In the end, the court held that the merger was unfair and the minority
shareholders prevailed on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 139 The court
found both the appraisal process and the price unfair. 4 It conducted its own
valuation analysis to determine the amount the minority group "would have
received in a merger negotiated at arm's-length between parties with equal
bargaining strength."'' 4 The remedy for breach of fiduciary duty was identi-
cal to the appraisal award.
As discussed above, in statutory appraisal cases, the Delaware courts are
required to determine whether the minority shareholders received fair
value. 43 The courts consider the market value of the stock in these cases, but
do not rely completely on it.'" The market, in such circumstances, may be
unable to act efficiently, particularly if information was withheld from it,
and thus may not value the shares fairly. When statutory appraisal actions
are brought with claims of fiduciary duty breach, the claim is similar; that is,
the litigants are asking the court to determine whether the majority has dealt
with the minority fairly. Both analyses, therefore, turn on the issue of fair-
ness and implicitly reflect the belief that when the parties do not act fairly,
the market may not operate efficiently.
A related body of fiduciary duty case law concerns the integrity of dis-
closures made by corporate fiduciaries. In Delaware, the duty to
communicate fully and accurately to shareholders is part of the duty of




139. Id. at 313,344.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 313.
142. Id. at 344.
143. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
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loyalty and good faith.'4 5 This duty has been clearly articulated by the Dela-
ware courts as requiring directors to disclose to shareholders all material
facts bearing on a transaction requiring shareholder action.146 More recently,
the Delaware courts have been expanding the duty to require honesty and
fairness when directors of a corporation voluntarily communicate with
shareholders. 47 This obligation is consistent with the notion that the Dela-
ware courts are concerned with assuring that markets operate efficiently.
They can only do so if they are provided full and honest information.
C. The Link to SOX
The objectives of the appraisal statutes and courts adjudicating whether
shareholders have been dealt with fairly are consistent with the goals of
SOX. 14 As noted by the Senate Committee Report, the purpose of SOX "isto address the systemic and structural weaknesses affecting our capital mar-
145. See. e.g.. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001); Malone v. Brincat,
722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); see also E. Norman Veasey with Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Hap-
pened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1476 (2005) ("In my view, it is axiomatic that directors
who deliberately lie to their stockholders about material company finances have violated one or
more of their fiduciary duties.").
146. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that there is an
obligation to disclose material facts pertaining to a merger); see also Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d
773 (Del. 1993) (focusing on the materiality of disclosures).
147. See, e.g., Malone, 722 A.2d at 14. ("Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive
false communications from directors even in the absence of a request for shareholder action.");
Shamrock Holdings of Cal. v. Iger, No. 1330-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *16-18 (June 6, 2005)
(finding complaint well-pled regarding allegations of breach of fiduciary duty due to misleading
statements in CEO selection process); Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (refusing to dismiss the complaint where it was alleged that the former company presi-
dent provided misleading information to a preferred stockholder). In Jackson National Life, the
court further ruled:
[W]hen directors communicate with stockholders, they must recognize their duty of loyalty
[to] do so with honesty and fairness, regardless of the stockholders' status as preferred or
common, and regardless of the absence of a request for action required pursuant to a statute,
the corporation's certificate of incorporation or any bylaw provision.
Jackson National Life, 741 A.2d at 390.
This issue has prompted significant commentary. See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transpar-
ency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate Disclosure,
34 GA. L. REv. 505 (2000) (examining the connection between fiduciary law and corporate disclo-
sure to shareholders); Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of
Delaware Corporations'Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2000) (exam-
ining Malone in the context of fiduciary duty and in comparison to federal securities laws); Jennifer
O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of
Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475
(2002) (comparing disclosure law in Delaware to federal securities laws); Holly M. Barbera, Note,
Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations: Resolving Questions after Malone v. Brincat, 26 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 563 (2001) (arguing that a director's mental state should be a critical component to a
disclosure analysis); Nicole M. Kim, Note, Malone v. Brincat: The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty of
Corporate Directors Under Delaware Law, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1151 (1999) (arguing that Malone
created uncertainty in disclosure law).
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
various sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
kets which were revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and cor-
porate financial and broker-dealer responsibility."''4 9 Moreover, Thomas A.
Bowman, President and CEO of the Association for Investment Manage-
ment and Research, testified in a prepared statement that "[o]nly if the
investing public believes that the information available to them is fair, accu-
rate, and transparent can they have confidence in the integrity of the
financial markets and the investment professionals who serve them."'"5
Fairness in value is the lynchpin of Delaware's appraisal statute and its
fiduciary duty concerns. To the extent one of the goals of SOX is to promote
disclosure of fair and accurate information to the markets, it is consistent
with the fairness concerns of Delaware corporate law. However, SOX does
not eliminate the need for careful review of fairness by the state courts. To
the extent conflicts of interest still exist, fairness can only be attained by
careful scrutiny of conflicted transactions. In the words of Chancellor
Strine, "We need the federal government to vigorously enforce national laws
mandating accurate and sound accounting of corporate health, and the rou-
tine disclosure of material information to stockholders. When the federal
government plays that role well, and when Delaware enforces fiduciary du-
ties expertly, investors are well served."''
II. RETIREMENT PLAN POLICY AND THE EMH
U.S. retirement-plan policy has long reflected the tension between bal-
ancing tax and other incentives for sponsorship of benefit plans with
provisions that protect employees from malfeasance in employer-sponsored
benefit plans. As such, regulatory authority for defined-contribution plans is
divided between the Department of Labor ("DOL") and the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS"). 52 The primary bifurcation in pension plan typology is
between defined-benefit ("DB") plans, in which employers bear the invest-
ment risk, and defined-contribution ("DC") plans, in which employees bear
the investment risk. 151 In this Article we address only DC plans.
DC plans, which include 401(k) plans and employee-stock-ownership
plans ("ESOPs"), have become the dominant type of employer-sponsored
retirement planning vehicle in the U.S. 14 The 401(k) plans of most large
149. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002).
150. Id. at 32-33. See also infra notes 263-264 for further comments regarding the purpose of
SOX.
151. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate L.0w and Some of the New
Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 686 (2005).
152. See Dana M. Muir, Note, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan Terminations
and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1038 (1989) (noting that the DOL, IRS, and
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation share responsibility for administering ERISA).
153. Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV.
201,205-06 (1995).
154. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2001 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 1 (Feb. 2006), available at
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public companies provide an employer stock fund as one investment option
for plan members. 5 By definition, ESOPs are formed to invest primarily in
the stock of the employer.5 6 The company that sponsors a 401(k) plan or
ESOP, its directors, those of its employees who have discretionary authority
over the plan's administration or its assets, and the plan's directed trustee all
have fiduciary responsibilities to the employees who participate in the plan.
In the wake of stock-price drops due to factors such as corporate fraud, the
reevaluation of high-tech stocks, and weakness in industry groups, employ-
ees have alleged that fiduciaries for their company-sponsored employee
investment plans breached their obligations associated with the use of em-
ployer stock in the plans.'57 This Part analyzes the role of the EMH in these
controversies. It begins with some history on the use of the EMH in pension
policy. It then considers the fallacies and misunderstandings reflected in the
courts' and DOL's EMH analysis regarding directed-trustee liability.'
A. History of the EMH in Pension Policy
Regulatory interest in using efficient markets financial theory to set pen-
sion-plan policy dates back to at least 1975. The then-current head of
welfare and pension programs at the DOL stated that "[a]dvocates of mod-
em portfolio theory reject the view that focuses solely on the risky assets
held by a plan and instead realize that each investment should be evaluated
in the context of the entire portfolio."' 59 By 1979 the DOL had issued a final
regulation on fiduciary obligation in the diversification of pension-plan as-
sets. 6 The regulation requires a pension plan fiduciary to take into account
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2001pensionplanbulletin.PDF (contrasting DC plan assets of ap-
proximately $2.1 trillion with DB plan assets of $1.8 trillion in 2001).
155. See JACK L. VANDERHEI, ERBI SPECIAL REPORT-COMPANY STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS:
RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF ISCEBS MEMBERS 4 (2002).
156. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2000).
157. See Muir & Schipani, supra note 3, at 462-70.
158. In some employer stock cases, fiduciaries that are not directed trustees have attempted to
rely on the EMH as a defense. The arguments typically are made in response to allegations that
fiduciaries breached their obligations either by failing to communicate sufficient information regard-
ing the company stock's prospects or by conveying inaccurate information about those prospects.
Fiduciaries respond that, according to the EMH, if they would have made the more extensive or
corrective disclosures, those disclosures would have caused the stock price to fall. The price de-
crease would have caused the employee investors to lose money. Thus, the argument goes, the
principles of the EMH mean that fiduciaries did the right thing by not making the more extensive or
corrective disclosures. To date courts have either rejected the argument or determined it constituted
a factual matter for trial and not the basis for summary disposition. See In re Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. ERISA Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that an EMH defense is
not suitable for summary judgment); In Re Honeywell Int'l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21585, at *42 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004) ("First, because they raise issues of causation
and damages, they are essentially fact-based arguments inappropriate on a motion to dismiss. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more significantly, they are flawed on the merits.").
159. Richard H. Koppes and Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduci-
ary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413, 437 (1995)
(quoting a statement on file with authors).
160. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2006).
such factors as "[t]he composition of the portfolio with regard to diversifica-
tion."' 16' The preamble makes it clear that the prudence of a particular
investment must be judged within the context of the entire plan portfolio. 162
Most commentators have cited these regulatory statements as evidence of
the DOL's acceptance of modem portfolio theory ("MPT"). 163 Others have
observed though that the DOL "acknowledge[s] portfolio theory, but almost
wholly fail[s] to incorporate the insights of [MPT]."' 6
Diversification of plan investments is one of the four statutory duties of
a plan fiduciary. 65 DC plans may relieve the fiduciaries of responsibility for
asset allocation and diversification by delegating those decisions to employ-
ees. In order to insulate fiduciaries, a plan must offer at least three
investment vehicles with different risk and return qualities.' 66 Nothing,
though, requires employees to diversify their assets among the available
investment vehicles. Thus, although fiduciaries have a statutory and regula-
tory obligation in DR plans to diversify assets, that obligation does not
apply in 401(k) plans when investment allocation decisions are delegated to
plan participants.
6 7
The result of the diversification exception is that DB plans, where em-
ployers bear investment risk, have diversification obligations, whereas DC
plans, where employees bear the investment risk, have no such requirement.
The rationale for allowing employees to invest their plan assets without re-
gard to MPT principles may reflect a willingness to allow individual
employees to invest in accordance with their own risk tolerances and an un-
willingness to be paternalistic in this setting. Or, perhaps it is a response to
161. Id.
162. Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility: Investment of Plan Assets Under the
"Prudence" Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979).
163. E.g., Koppes & Reilly, supra note 159, at 437; Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties
Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 226 (1992); Jerry W. Markham,
Privatizing Social Security, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 798 (2001); Thomas M. Griffin, Note,
Investing Labor Union Pension Funds in Workers: How ERISA and the Common Law Trust May
Benefit Labor By Economically Targeting Investment, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 11, 36-37 (1998);
Stephen P. Johnson, Note, Trustee Investment: The Prudent Person Rule or Modern Portfolio The-
ory, You Make the Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1993). Koppes and Reilly explain that
MPT "holds that risk is relative and depends upon the investment horizon of a given fund. Its propo-
nents stress the need for diversification, both across and within different types of assets." Koppes &
Reilly, supra note 159, at 436.
164. Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risksfor Anxious Workers, 1996 Wis.
L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1996).
165. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). ERISA's legislative history explicitly
adopts the concept that diversification decreases risk. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,5085 ("Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest the
whole or an unduly large proportion of the trust property in one type of security or in various types
of securities dependent upon the success of one enterprise or upon conditions in one locality, since
the effect is to increase the risk of large losses.").
166. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(i)(B) (2006).
167. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 requires 401 (k) plans to begin permitting employees
to divest employer stock held in their plan accounts. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-280, § 901, 120 Stat. 780, 1026-33 (to be codified at 1.R.C. § 401(a)(35) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(i)).
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the preference of employers who have sought to avoid limitations on plan
use of company stock. 168 In any case, the policy is entrenched. Congress has
considered capping employee account holdings of employer stock but to
169date has refused to do so.
Commentators such as Professor Jeffrey Gordon have questioned the
wisdom of permitting employees to remain undiversified in their company-
sponsored employee investment plan accounts. 70 The concentrated invest-
ment of plan assets in employer stock, after all, has led to substantial losses
in employee accounts at companies such as Enron and may not be the wisest
use of tax incentives intended to enable the accumulation of wealth for re-
tirement. '7' By generally critiquing the lack of regulation requiring
employees to diversify their investments, Professor Gordon recognizes the
much broader problem missed by commentators who would cap the amount
of employer stock any individual could hold in a plan account. Rather than
accept too much risk by concentrating investments in employer stock, sig-
nificant numbers of employees under-diversify by selecting low-risk
investments such as fixed-income alternatives and bonds.72 Given that most
large plans offer a number of investment alternatives and some offer em-
ployees the ability to invest in any publicly traded security, ,74 the
possibilities for under-diversification are not limited to employer stock.175 If
future policy-makers rely on MPT to require diversification of DC plan ac-
168. See, e.g., Position Statement, The ERISA Indus. Comm., ERIC Position Statement: De-
fined Contribution Provisions in the Nat'l Employee Sav. and Trust Equity Guarantee Act (July
2005), http://www.eric.org/forms/uploadFiles/571200000013.filename.DC PositionStatement.pdf
(objecting to proposed diversification requirements regarding company stock); Enron and Beyond:
Legislative Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Employer-Employee Relations of the H.
Comm. On Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 51-52 (2002) (statement of Angela Reynolds,
American Benefits Council) (arguing against proposals to cap company stock investments in 401(k)
plans).
169. Dana M. Muir, The U.S. Culture of Employee Ownership and 401(k) Plans, 14 ELDER
L.J. 1, 8 (2006).
170. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 1233, 1248-49 (2002); see also
Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15
YALE J. ON REG. 61, 88 (1998) (advocating a 10 percent cap on employer stock); Norman Stein,
Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn from
Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 855, 857-58 (2002) ("[P]articipants in qualified retirement plans
should not be permitted to hold more than an insignificant amount of employer stock in their retire-
ment plan.").
171. Gordon, supra note 170, at 1249.
172. Id.
173. Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Overview of Survey Results of the 48th An-
nual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans, http://www.psca.org/DATA/48th.html (finding plans
offer an average of eighteen fund investment options).
174. Ian D. Lanoff & Roberta J. Ufford, ERISA Protections Provide Guidance for Social
Security Privatization, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1353, 1360 (2001) (discussing open brokerage
accounts).
175. Professor Muir has suggested that rather than cap particular types of investments or
mandating diversification, plans should be encouraged to offer investment advice to plan partici-
pants. Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment Education: Is No
Advice Really the Best Advice? 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 51-54 (2002).
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counts, they must recognize the full extent of the under-diversification prob-
lems.
In its most recent purported reliance on finance theory, the DOL in De-
cember 2004 issued a field assistance bulletin largely relieving directed
trustees of plans sponsored by publicly traded companies from their fiduci-
ary obligation to ensure the prudence of investment directions they
execute.176 In that bulletin, which is discussed below in more detail,177 the
DOL states that a directed trustee "will rarely have an obligation under
ERISA to question the prudence of a direction to purchase publicly traded
securities at the market price solely on the basis of publicly available infor-
mation." The bulletin explicitly refers to the efficiency of markets in
ensuring "that stock prices reflect publicly available information and known
risks,"'9 apparently reflecting the DOL's acceptance of the semi-strong ver-
sion of the EMH.
In sum, ERISA's legislative history and statutory language reflect some
acceptance of modem finance theory, at least to the extent of appreciating
the benefits of asset diversification. Over time the DOL has moved from
general statements about and acceptance of MPT to its recent explicit reli-
ance on the EMH to largely relieve directed trustees from fiduciary
obligations for transactions involving the stock of publicly traded compa-
nies. The next Section examines the DOL's reliance on the EMH.
B. The Directed Trustee and the EMH
Conflicts of interest are inherent in the use of employer stock in com-
pany-sponsored employee investment plans. The typical conflicts arise
because company executives and directors decide whether a 401 (k) plan will
offer employees the option of investing in company stock, whether the com-
pany will use company stock to match employee contributions, whether the
company will sponsor an ESOP, and whether changes should be made to
any of these arrangements. The situation of company executives partially
parallels the situation of the defendants in the appraisal actions discussed
above because both cohorts often enjoy comparative informational advan-
tages.
The directed trustee typically has fewer conflicts than do the company
employees who act as fiduciaries. 8 0 The assets of each plan must be held in
176. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN No. 2004-03, FIDUCIARY RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF DIRECT TRUSTEES (2004) [hereinafter FAB 2004-03], available at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/pdf/fab-2004-3.pdf.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 187-224.
178. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 5.
179. Id.
180. The directed trustee's interest in maintaining its work on behalf of the plan creates the
possibility it will be inclined to favor the wishes of the plan sponsor. To date courts have rejected
arguments that this constitutes a sufficient conflict of interest to taint the directed trustee's decision-
making. E.g., /i re RCN Litig., No. 04-5068 (SRC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12929, at *28-29
(D.N.J. Mar. 21. 2006).
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a trust.' Sponsoring employers typically appoint a directed trustee to accept
contributions and execute investment directions. The DOL's adoption of the
EMH has changed the landscape of directed-trustee fiduciary responsibil-
ity. 182
Prior to December 2004, courts were split over the extent of a directed
trustee's obligation to review the prudence of investment directions. In the
high profile Enron case, the court denied the directed trustee's motion to
dismiss, stating that plaintiffs had alleged "with factual support that the di-
rected trustee knew or should have known from a number of significant
waving red flags and/or regular reviews of the company's financial state-
ments that the employer company was in financial danger and its stock
greatly diminished in value.""' In its Enron amicus brief, the Secretary of
Labor had argued that the "knew or should have known" standard was the
appropriate standard for directed-trustee conduct and derived from the
common law of trusts.84 Other courts disagreed with the Enron court and
the Secretary of Labor's position, determining that directed trustees rarely
have an obligation to review the prudence of the investment directions they
receive."' Regardless of the courts' positions on the scope of liability of di-
rected trustees, nowhere in the opinions issued prior to December 2004 do
any of the courts explicitly refer to the EMH as the rationale for their deci-
sions.
That changed radically in December 2004 with the DOL's release of
Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-03 ("FAB 2004-03"). Its verbiage indicates
that the DOL adopted the semi-strong form of the EMH because the FAB
distinguishes directed-trustee obligations based on whether the directed trus-
tee possesses nonpublic or only public information about the employer. 
6
This Section first addresses situations where directed trustees allegedly have
access only to public information. The next Section turns to considerations
of nonpublic information.
181. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Note the minor exceptions created in subsection
(b).
182. See infra Section H.B. 1.
183. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F Supp. 2d 511, 601 (S.D. Tex.
2003); see also Firstier Bank v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that trustee had
complied with a "'knows or ought to know"' standard) (quoting 2A WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT
ON TRUSTS § 185, at 574 (4th ed. 1987)). Northern Trust, the directed trustee for Enron's plan, set-
tled the ERISA litigation for $37.5 million. At Deadline, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, April 3, 2006,
at 1.
184. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Motions to
Dismiss at 47-49, In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (No. H-01-3913), available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefstenronbrief-8-30-
02.pdf.
185. E.g., Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 40 F.3d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 1994).
186. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 4-6.
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1. Directed Trustees with Public Information and the EMH
FAB 2004-03 states that a directed trustee's obligation to review the
prudence of individual investments is "significantly limited"'' and an
ERISA directed trustee's fiduciary responsibilities are "significantly nar-
rower than the duties generally ascribed to a discretionary trustee under
common law trust principles."'88 According to the FAB, a directed trustee
may have an obligation of further inquiry regarding employer stock direc-
tions at the point public information such as 8-Ks or a bankruptcy filing
"call[s] into serious question a company's viability as a going concern.'' 9
The only other factual situation that may give rise to a duty regarding public
information is one in which the "company, its officers or directors [have
been] formally charged by state or Federal regulators with financial irregu-larities. "'90
The first directed trustee decision issued after December 2004, In re
WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, largely adopted the DOL's application of
the EMH and established the trend of using efficient market considerations
in these cases.' After WorldCom's financial implosion in the wake of ac-
counting scandals, employees who had held WorldCom stock in its 401(k)
plan sued numerous defendants, including Merrill Lynch as directed trus-
tee.' 92 Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that Merrill Lynch breached its
fiduciary duties when it continued to execute buy orders for the WorldCom
stock fund after WorldCom became an imprudent retirement-plan invest-
ment for employees. 93 All of the plaintiffs' allegations involved Merrill
Lynch's possession of public information.194
First among the "well settled principles" cited by the WorldCom court as
supporting FAB 2004-03's narrow view of fiduciary obligation is the court's
belief that "financial markets are assumed to be efficient, such that the
prices of securities reflect all publicly available information and known
187. Id. at4.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id.
191. In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 354 F Supp. 2d 423, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), set-
tlement approved, No. 02 Civ. 4816 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28686, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 22, 2005); see also In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1038-41
(S.D. Ohio 2006) (applying the DOL standard to dismiss the claims against Putnam Fiduciary Trust
Co. as directed trustee since there was no significant publicly available information questioning the
company's financial viability and Putnam did not have any material nonpublic information); In re
RCN Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12929, at *20-21 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2006) (applying the DOL
standard to dismiss the claims against Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB as directed trustee since there
was insufficient publicly available information questioning the company's financial viability).
192. In re WorldCom, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28686, at *1-3.
193. In re WorldCom, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 426-27.
194. Id. at449 n.24.
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risks."' 9 In turn, the court relied on Basic, Inc. v. Levinson as the authority
for its endorsement of the EMH.' 96
Ultimately the WorldCom court articulated the standard for a directed
trustee as follows:
When a directed trustee receives a direction to invest plan assets in the se-
curities of a company, or when plan assets are already invested in such
securities, a directed trustee has a fiduciary duty of inquiry under ERISA
when it knows or should know of reliable public information that calls into
serious question the company's short-term viability as a going concern.97
This standard modifies the DOL's suggested standard by requiring the
public information to be "reliable" as opposed to "clear and compelling,"
and by limiting the time frame to "short-term."'9 " In spite of analyst recom-
mendations to sell WorldCom securities and a six-month period during the
class period when WorldCom's stock price decreased, the court decided
there was no evidence of "reliable public information ... that called into
serious question the short-term viability of WorldCom as a going con-
cern." '99 The court dismissed all claims against Merrill Lynch.' °°
To date, the only significant court criticism of the DOL's FAB comes
from the Seventh Circuit in an opinion authored by Judge Posner. The court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of State Street Bank & Trust Co.
("State Street"), the directed trustee for United Airline's ESOP.20 ' The plain-
tiffs asserted that State Street's fiduciary violation occurred when it failed
until "the eve of United's bankruptcy"20 2 to sell the ESOP's United stock.
Plaintiffs argued that State Street should have begun selling United stock
immediately after United's CEO sent a letter to all employees containing
serious warnings about United's financial prospects. Judge Posner and his
colleagues determined that the letter did not give rise to a sell obligation for
State Street, saying that it is not imprudent for a directed trustee "to assume
that a major stock market . . . provides the best estimate of the value of the
stocks traded on it that is available to him.'2" 4 Although Judge Posner's opin-
ion indicates complete acceptance of the EMH, it criticizes the FAB's
standard as not being administrable because the FAB only states that a di-
195. Id. at 447.
196. Id. at 447 n.23.
197. Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 449 n.25.
199. Id. at 449.
200. Id. at 451.
201. Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F3d 404, 413 (7th Cir. 2006).
202. Id. at 407.
203. Id. at 408.
204. Id.
205. Id. ("[A]t every point in the long slide of United's stock price, that price was the best
estimate available either to State Street or to the Committee of the company's value .... ").
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rected trustee "may" have duties and any selling mandated by the FAB
would occur after the stock had lost much of its value.2°6
The Seventh Circuit did, however, suggest an alternative approach, also
based in finance theory, for evaluating the prudence of directed trustees. As
United's stock price fell, the ratio of fixed-interest debt to equity increased
207
so the risk borne by stockholders also increased. The Court explained its
theory of liability:
The source of the duty to diversify would not be the trustees [sic] dis-
agreement with the market valuation (their failure to predict the company's
impending collapse), but the excessive risk imposed on employee-
shareholders by the rise in the debt-equity ratio of the employer's stock
.... How excessive would depend in the first instance on the amount and
character of the employees' other assets, for, as we have already indicated,
it is the riskiness of one's portfolio, not of a particular asset in the portfo-
lio, that is important to the risk-averse investor.20
The "excessive risk" theory of liability suggested by Judge Posner and
his colleagues seems to recognize that the various risks of owning a particu-
lar stock as part of a portfolio, which include market risk, industry risk, and
firm risk,2°9 are different from the problem of under-diversification, which,
according to MPT, is always uncompensated risk.2 0 As Professor Langbein
has recognized when writing about the Uniform Prudent Investor Act:
The idea that some securities are intrinsically too risky ... collides with
the central findings of Modern Portfolio Theory. MPT teaches that the risk
intrinsic to any marketable security is presumptively already discounted
into the current price of the security. Hence, on an expected return basis,
212the risk is compensated risk.
Under efficient-markets concepts and MPT, undiversified risk is uncom-
pensated, so it always is unduly risky. The point the Seventh Circuit
struggles with implicitly is that for those who believe in efficient markets,
finance theory provides only one answer to the question of when an undi-
versified portfolio becomes too risky-and that answer is: "always. 21 3
Stated in terms of ERISA's fiduciary requirements, the most significant dif-
ficulty occurs in attempting to determine when it is imprudent for an
employer to continue to add employer stock to an employee's account
through matching contributions or ESOP allocations. From the MPT
206. Id. at 411.
207. Id. at 408-09.
208. Id. at 411.
209. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing,
81 IowA L. REV. 641,647 (1996).
210. Id. at 648.
211. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994).
212. Langbein, supra note 209, at 649.
213. See id. at 664-65 ("We now know that the advantages of diversifying a portfolio of secu-
rities are so great that it is folly not to do it:').
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perspective, the answer is "whenever the additional stock causes the em-
ployee's portfolio to be undiversified"-in reality nearly always the
situation. From the opposite perspective, ERISA does not limit investment
in company stock in DC plans, so such investments are always prudent. The
correct analysis, though, lies somewhere in the middle. Nothing in ERISA,
DOL regulatory materials, or jurisprudence requires either DB or DC plans
to be properly diversified within the tenets of MPT. And it would be absurd
to argue that simply because ERISA does not explicitly prohibit an em-
ployer from making its matching contribution using the riskiest stock traded
on NASDAQ that it would be prudent for the employer to do so. Instead,
prudence remains a flexible fiduciary concept that is not subject to formu-
laic precision.
2. Directed Trustees with Nonpublic Information and the EMH
In some instances, directed trustees may possess nonpublic information
that could cause them to question the prudence of investing in employer
stock. That information may directly or indirectly relate to the employer and
the source of the information may or may not be the employer. Under the
semi-strong form of the EMH, the capital markets incorporate all publicly
available information but not nonpublic information into the stock price.! 1
Nonpublic information is not usually assumed to be reflected in stock
prices. The DOL still takes a narrow view, though, of a directed trustee's
duty to evaluate prudence based on nonpublic information of which that
directed trustee may be aware. Only where "individuals responsible for the
directed trustee services have actual knowledge of material non-public in-
formation"25 does the obligation to consider prudence fall to the directed
trustee.
In one recent case, Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB ("MLTC") served as di-
rected trustee for RCN Corporation's plan. 26 According to plaintiffs,
affiliates of MLTC allegedly advised RCN and were "intimately knowl-
edgeable" about RCN's affairs.27 Due to pleading deficiencies, the court
refused to address arguments made in plaintiffs' brief that the affiliates' ac-
tivities caused MLTC to possess nonpublic information about RCN.28 Nor
did MLTC have any obligation to advise RCN employees that an MLTC
affiliate was counseling institutional investors to steer away from what it
believed to be overly speculative RCN stock . 9 In contrast, in a number of
related cases plaintiffs have survived motions to dismiss by alleging that
214. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infornation, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 771 n.19 (1985).
215. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 5.
216. In re RCN Litig., No. 04-5068(SRC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12929, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar.
21,2006).
217. Id. at *19 n.6.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *21-22.
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directed trustees had nonpublic information that late trading was occurring
in mutual funds.20 For example, in Zarate v. Bank One Corp., employees of
Bank One alleged that Bank One Trust, the directed trustee of their plan,
possessed nonpublic information that late trading was occurring in One
Group funds.2  The Zarate court quoted the distinction drawn by FAB
2004-03 between public and nonpublic information to support its decision
to deny dismissal.
Selling employer stock or advising others to sell the stock on the basis
of material nonpublic information could, of course, violate the federal secu-
rities laws. One would expect that even to the limited extent that the DOL
imposes a duty on directed trustees that possess nonpublic information to
evaluate the prudence of investment directions, directed trustees would ar-
gue that the duty is nullified by the securities laws' ban on insider trading
and tipping. A parallel argument, however, has been made and frequently
rejected by the courts in actions against company fiduciaries alleging viola-
tion of their duties of prudence and honest communication.
In one case, the former CEO and the outside directors argued that even if
they had any fiduciary duties under ERISA to disclose information about the
company's prospects, "they could not as a matter of law [have] breached
them because to have disclosed non-public information about [the company
to employees] would have violated securities laws. 223 In response to similar
arguments, the WorldCom and Enron district courts decided that ERISA
fiduciaries can and should satisfy extensive disclosure duties under ERISA
and the securities laws, even though that may require the fiduciaries to make
public disclosures beyond those needed to meet the minimum standards of
224the federal securities laws.
If directed trustees argue that they cannot make further inquiries based
on nonpublic information because doing so could result in transactions that
violate the securities laws, one would expect the courts to reach the same
result as when other fiduciaries make the argument. Directed trustees must
fulfill their fiduciary obligations, even if that also requires additional disclo-
sures in order to avoid securities law liability. Note that if a directed
trustee's inquiry stopped the plan from purchasing employer stock, that
220. Calderon v. Amvescap PLC, No. JFM-04-0824, MDL-15864, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12023, at *5-6 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2006); Corbett v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. JFM-04-0883,
MDL-15863, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12022, at *6-7 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2006); Zarate v. BankOne
Corp., No. JFM-04-0830, MDL-15863, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12026, at *5-6 (D. Md. Feb. 27,
2006).
221. Zarate, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12026, at *5-6.
222. Id.
223. Rankin v. Rots, 278 F Supp. 2d 853, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2003), settlement approved, No.
02-CV-71045, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45706 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2006).
224. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 563-67 (S.D.
Tex. 2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F Supp. 2d 745, 766-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
settlement approved, No. 02 Civ. 4816 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28686 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov.
22, 2005). Contra In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. COO-20030 RMW, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19473, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2002) ("Fiduciaries are not obligated to violate the
securities laws in order to satisfy their fiduciary duties.").
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action would not constitute insider trading because either a purchase or a
sale of securities is required to establish a violation.
3. The EMH as a Ruse for Directed Trustee Protection?
In contrast to SOX, where Professor Romano and others have criticized
--221
new policies for ignoring academic finance research, in the ERISA context
policy-makers and courts are purporting to rely on the EMH in setting sub-
stantive standards. Instead of evaluating whether "policy entrepreneurs"
created inefficiencies in legislating while ignoring empirical literature, the
question here becomes how well policy-makers do when they invoke aca-
demic theory to support their decisions. Not only did the DOL explicitly
rely on the EMH to narrow the scope of directed trustees' fiduciary obliga-
tions, it also extended the Supreme Court's use of the EMH in Basic far
beyond Basic's context of proving plaintiff reliance in actions for alleged
securities law violations. What began in Basic as a concept acting as a plain-
tiff's sword has been hammered by the DOL and directed trustees into a
226
shield for defendants. Whether this use of the EMH establishes a trend
that will be picked up in other areas of law remains to be seen.
The bottom line question is whether sufficient rationales support the po-
sition that directed trustees have no duty of inquiry regarding investment
directions unless one of the narrow exceptions exists. The next Section con-
siders that question.
a. The SOX and EMH Rationales
The DOL recites three reasons to support its view that directed trustees
rarely have any duty of inquiry unless they possess material nonpublic in-
formation. One explanation is that the securities laws require accurate
227disclosures. The numerous corporate scandals that preceded SOX made it
obvious that federal securities law did not fully protect against fraud in the
securities markets. Perhaps the DOL believes that SOX solved all potential
problems of noncompliance in the future, but the wealth of academic analy-
sis, including this symposium, considering the efficacy of SOX shows the
fallacy of relying on SOX to stand in the place of fiduciary obligations. As
228
we have shown above, the Delaware courts do not operate under the illu-
sion that federal securities laws always result in full and accurate disclosure.
In the explanation that has gained the most momentum in the courts
since the FAB, the DOL states that "markets generally are assumed to be
efficient so that stock prices reflect publicly available information and
225. See Romano, supra note 5, at 1527-29.
226. Securities law also permits the use of the EMH as a defense, as in the situation of a de-
fendant arguing that the market saw through misstatements-the "truth on the market" defense.
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 176-77.
227. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 5.
228. Supra Part I.
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known risks."229 The DOL's use of the EMH is laudable in the sense that the
DOL did not fall into the trap Congress did in passing SOX and ignore an
entire field of research that might contribute to the development of efficient
regulation. The DOL's use of the EMH, however, goes too far in the other
direction. It fails to recognize the general challenges to the EMH, the fact
that many would agree that, in the real world, not all publicly traded securi-
ties always trade in an efficient market, and the heightened standard of
fiduciary obligation to which directed trustees are subject. And, the DOL
implies that the proper pricing of a security is the only consideration in
whether the purchase or sale of that security in a retirement portfolio is pru-
dent.
Any use of the EMH in establishing legal standards must take into ac-
count the current academic dispute on its robustness. A full evaluation of
that dispute is beyond the scope of this Article. However, there is no indica-
tion that the DOL assessed the significant criticisms of the EMH. Such an
assessment should be part of any policy-maker's decision to rely on empiri-
cal research in setting broad policy. Even in the situation of the EMH, where
the Supreme Court indicated some agreement with its principles, it is impor-
tant to remember that "the Court was not conducting a finance class when it
wrote the Basic decision. 23' Indeed, since then Professor Robert Shiller has
argued that the existence of market exuberance and bubbles leads to entire
markets being overpriced for periods of time.
23 2 Research on noise trading,23
234behavioral finance, insufficient availability and use of short selling oppor-
23' 236
tunities, and other contrary phenomena also have led researchers to
question the premises of the EMH.
In other contexts courts and policy-makers are far more skeptical of the
real-world robustness of the EMH than is the DOL. The Delaware statutory
appraisal cases often use market price as but one factor in establishing the
229. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 5.
230. The FAB is somewhat inconsistent on whether it leaves room for consideration that
publicly traded securities may or may not trade in an efficient market. In its discussions of directed
trustee obligations, it refers to all "publicly traded stock" and "publicly traded securities." id. at 4, 5.
In its conclusion it refers to "publicly traded securities on a generally recognized market." Id. at 7.
231. William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 856 (2005).
232. See SHILLER, supra note 11, at 190 ("The invocation of efficient markets theory to imply
that the recent upspike in the stock market is a routine and accurate response to genuine news is just
not correct. To justify the notion that the stock market is at the appropriate level now, we would have
to argue that it was not before. Such an argument would stand in sharp contradiction to efficient
markets theory.").
233. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 143.
234. Id. at 143-47.
235. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Cop. L. 715,725-30 (2003).
236. See Gordon, supra note 170, at 1235 ("Although the efficient market hypothesis is a
useful null hypothesis about the workings of a well-developed capital market, sophisticated applica-
tion in policy settings requires awareness of its limits as well as its power.").
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appropriate valuation of a security. The Delaware courts also examine, on
a case-by-case basis, whether the market for a particular stock appears to be
efficient.2 8 The very recognition of a right of action for security sellers to
challenge the fairness of a market price is inconsistent with the belief that
the market always accurately prices securities. The law review literature
abounds with discussions of the need for legal intervention in order to en-
239hance the efficiency of markets. Similarly, courts typically evaluate a
number of factors in securities-fraud cases to determine whether the security
was traded in an efficient market. 240 Arguably, increasing the efficiency of
the capital markets was a primary purpose of some of SOX's disclosure pro-
241
visions.
Even accepting the general premise of the EMH for purposes of this dis-
cussion, the employer-stock context raises at least the normal range of issues
for questioning the reliability of the EMH in specific instances. After all,
when a company executive makes a decision regarding the use of company
stock, that executive may be operating under a range of conflicts of interest
including valuation of personal stock and options investments, pressures
from shareholders regarding stock price, and the liquidity incentives associ-
ated with the use of company stock for plan contributions. The EMH's
prediction that the securities purchaser would place a buy order only due to
a belief that the stock is undervalued should be subject to particular scrutiny
in this context. After all, plan fiduciaries are not using personal assets for the
purchase and are likely to receive only a very small fraction of the securities
purchased in their personal accounts. Similarly, behavioral economists have
observed that employees frequently appear to engage in irrational behavior
242
when making decisions regarding employer-stock investments. The DOL's
recognition of the limits of the EMH may be reflected in the FAB's excep-
tions. If so, however, the DOL never admits its concerns and the exceptions
are grossly under-inclusive.
Since the DOL purports to rely largely on the efficiency of markets as its
rationale for relieving directed trustees possessing only public information
237. See supra text accompanying note 94-103.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
239. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 138 ("The securities markets (and securities regula-
tion) are a natural crucible for the research agenda of behavioral law and economics generally.").
240. Fisher, supra note 231, at 858-62 (discussing the Cammer factors and others).
241. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002) ("The purpose of the bill is to address the systemic
and structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets...
242. Muir, supra note 175, at 11-15.
243. There is another explanation for the exceptions in the FAB. The DOL may be using the
filing of bankruptcy and formal charges against a company or its officers as proxies for situations
where directed trustees should for some reason be especially cautious about the prudence of direc-
tions from company fiduciaries. Again, though, this explanation is unlikely to justify the exceptions.
But why choose only these two situations, and why delay implementation of a directed trustee duty
until the stock likely would have lost most of its value? Indeed, if those were the DOL's actual con-
cerns, one would expect to see a general standard identifying the concern, not two specific and
narrow fact situations.
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from any obligation of diligent inquiry except in the two exceptional cir-
cumstances, perhaps it believes that market inefficiencies occur in only
those two situations. In these contexts, uncertainty about market inefficiency
would be consistent with the ambiguous nature of the directed trustee's duty.
In both instances, the FAB states that the directed trustee "may" have to as-
sess the transaction at issue further'4 Perhaps the goal is for the directed
trustee to evaluate potential market failures in the hopes of identifying an
opportunity to liquidate at least a portion of the plan's investment in em-
ployer stock prior to a price collapse.
The "exception to efficient markets" explanation, however, makes little
sense from either a practical or a theoretical standpoint. From a theoretical
perspective, there is no indication that these two situations are particularly
likely to lead to efficient-market failures. Even if there were market failures
in these situations, it is fair to question why other situations giving rise to
market inefficiencies would not give equal rise to obligations for directed
trustees to evaluate those failures. An exception for all occurrences of mar-
ket failures might make theoretical sense, but an exception limited to two
245specific situations does not. Perhaps more important, as discussed above,
efficient pricing is not the only consideration in establishing whether a given
securities transaction is prudent for a retirement portfolio. 6
Practically speaking, using a "may" standard to define the obligation of
inquiry, with so little explication of when "may" might mean "must," pro-
247vides little useful direction to directed trustees. Finally, as Judge Posner
has implied,24 ' questioning the market integrity of a stock's price once the
company is in bankruptcy or formal charges have been brought against it or
its officers is much too late to avoid significant loss for the employee share-
holders whom the DOL is charged with protecting.
The DOL's position that directed trustees only have obligations of in-
quiry based on information of which they have actual knowledge creates yet
another concern. The actual knowledge standard provides an incentive for
directed trustees to avoid investigations even in the face of strong signals
that something is amiss at the employer. This is inconsistent with the usual
view that additional information is good for the functioning of an efficient
market as well as the traditional belief that fiduciaries should not be permit-
ted to avoid liability by remaining willfully ignorant.
244. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 6.
245. According to the language of the FAB, the directed trustee's obligation is limited to
questioning directions it receives from the named fiduciary-typically the company or a member of
management. This would appear to extend only to directions to purchase employer stock for match-
ing or other employer contributions. It is likely that the DOL intends the FAB to be construed in this
broader sense either because it believes that individual employees act as named fiduciaries when
giving directions to directed trustees, or because directions from the named fiduciary include all
general directions, such as the direction to follow participant directions and to maintain the status
quo of plan investments.
246. See supra text following note 212.
247. See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 204-206.
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b. The Fiduciary Rationale
The other rationale that the DOL supplies for its narrow view of the di-
rected-trustee obligation is fiduciary-related. Specifically, the DOL relies on
stringent ERISA fiduciary standards, which apply to the fiduciaries giving
investment directions, to support its view that directed trustees have virtu-
ally no duty of inquiry regarding the correctness of those investment
directions. 249 Elsewhere in the FAB the DOL recognizes that the statute pro-
hibits directed trustees from following any direction that the directed trustee
"knows or should know is contrary to ERISA ... [including a direction that]
violate[s] the prudence requirement of [ERISA.] '25 0 In effect, though, the
DOL assumes that the statute's fiduciary provisions effectively prevent a
fiduciary giving an investment direction from violating ERISA's prudence
standards. Apparently, since the underlying directions will not violate the
prudence requirements, the directed trustee will never be faced with a situa-
tion where the direction it receives violates its prudence obligation, so it has
no duty to make an independent inquiry about the direction. This reflects a
view of statutory compliance by conflicted fiduciaries that is as naive as the
DOL's apparent position that the federal securities laws fully eliminate fraud
and ensure market efficiency.
Comparing the DOL's approach to the EMH with the approach used in
Delaware for appraisal actions is particularly useful in the sense that the
most significant concerns tend to arise in circumstances where conflicted
insiders have substantial involvement in company-stock transactions. Under
both ERISA and state corporate law, those conflicted insiders with asym-
metrical informational advantages are fiduciaries. In comparison, the normal
corporate actors being regulated by SOX do not owe fiduciary obligations to
the company's shareholders.
Along with fiduciary status come obligations that cannot be wiped out
by mumbling the magic letters EMH. Traditionally, fiduciary law has re-
flected the principle that a trustee acting under a conflict of interest will too
often be tempted to place personal interest ahead of the beneficiary's best
interest.:5 This concern is implicit in the appraisal cases, because the courts'
evaluations of numerous factors in establishing a fair price frequently deal
with conflicted fiduciaries who have informational advantages and are heav-
ily involved in the transactions. 252 Similarly, corporate law policy-makers
permit exculpation of fiduciaries for breaches of duty of care but not of loy-
alty.253 There appears to be inherent distrust in market forces in the face of
meaningful conflicts of interest.
Significant differences exist among directed trustees, the corporate in-
siders who take part in the decision to use company stock in benefit plans,
249. FAB 2004-03, supra note 176, at 5.
250. Id. at 3.
251. Muir & Schipani, supra note 3, at 440.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 31-87.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
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and those insiders who participate in a going-private transaction or other
similar corporate reorganization. The directed trustee's conflicts of interest
typically would be more attenuated than the conflicts of the insiders. Al-
though the insiders may have a direct interest in manipulating the
company's stock price, the conflict experienced by the directed trustee typi-
cally would be its interest in maintaining the plan's business by not
alienating company management and in minimizing its expenditures on plan
oversight. Directed trustees also typically have substantially less access than
internal corporate actors to informational advantages.
Recognition that directed trustees tend to operate under fewer conflicts
than do company insiders, though, is not at all the same as wholly negating
the importance of the directed trustee's fiduciary role or the threat of a loy-
alty violation. The common law equivalent of ERISA's directed trustee
occurs when "a person other than the trustee ... [has] the power to control
the trustee's actions. 254 If the party giving directions is a fiduciary, then the
common law trustee has an obligation to follow the directions unless-and
here the standard varies depending on the authority referenced-the trustee
"'knows,' 'ought to know,' [or has] 'reason to suspect,' ,255 that the direction




Regardless of whether one chooses the term "ought to know," or had
"reason to suspect," or something similar, the common law standard estab-
lishes a sensible basis for directed trustee liability. Hundreds of years of
trust law establish that directed fiduciaries have an obligation of care and
prudence in situations where "waving red flags '25 7 warn the trustee of dan-
ger to trust beneficiaries. There is no indication in ERISA that Congress
intended to abrogate this centuries-long, clearly developed protection for
trust beneficiaries. In fact, ERISA's requirement that most plan assets be
held in trust,21s its broad definition of fiduciary status,2'9 and its articulated
260fiduciary standards signify the exact opposite.
c. A Litigation Efficiency Rationale?
So, we return to the bottom line question: do sufficient rationales sup-
port the argument that directed trustees have no duty of inquiry regarding
the prudence of investment directions unless one of three narrow situations
exists? None of the DOL's rationales-the EMH, federal securities regulation,
254. Patricia Wick Hatamyar, See No Evil? The Role of the Directed Trustee Under ERISA, 64
TENN. L. REV. 1,38 (1996).
255. Id. at 40.
256. In contrast, if the direction is given by a trust beneficiary then the trustee must follow the
direction so long as the direction complies with the terms of the trust. Id. at 38.
257. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 601 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
258. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000).
259. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2000).
260. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
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and ERISA fiduciary regulation-fully sustain such a broad exemption from
a duty of prudence, even when looked at cumulatively.
Let us assume a world where the broad insulation from obligation out-
lined in the DOL's FAB is nullified. Directed trustees would face litigation
211in significant numbers of 401(k) employer-stock and ESOP cases. Using a
traditional "ought to know," or "had reason to suspect," or similar standard,
one would expect plaintiffs to have an uphill battle in these cases. Propo-
nents of the EMH can be expected to argue that any "waving red flags" that
should have alerted directed trustees were equally observable by all inves-
tors. As a result, EMH adherents will believe that the market price of the
employer stock always reflects those publicly observable flags and that the
employer securities were, thus, efficiently priced for the observable condi-
tions.
This EMH argument is fair so far as it goes but it does not justify an ir-
rebuttable presumption that the directed trustee has met its fiduciary
obligation simply because a security is publicly traded. Even accepting the
basic premise of the EMH, there are many reasons to believe that there are
times when stocks are not efficiently priced because of manipulative behav-
ior, thin markets, exuberance, and all the other reasons being raised in the
finance literature. But, other than the very narrow exceptions, that is exactly
what the DOL has established in favor of directed trustees-an irrebuttable
presumption that they have met their fiduciary obligations simply because
the stock is publicly traded. If, after serious review of the finance literature,
policy-makers remain convinced of the general principles of the EMH, it
would make sense to articulate standards permitting directed trustees to use
the EMH as a defense. In the meantime, the courts should evaluate EMH
arguments on a case-by-case basis. And, although the task may be difficult,
they must take into consideration factors beyond pricing that affect the pru-
dence of the investment.
Plaintiffs, however, should be allowed to overcome any EMH defense by
proving either that the stock in question did not trade in an efficient market
or that, even though the market was efficient in incorporating information,
there was insufficient or inaccurate information in the market and that the
directed trustee knew or ought to have known or had reason to suspect that
the stock was not a prudent investment. This approach would permit the
robustness of the EMH to be considered on a case-by-case basis and would
261. Material provided by the DOL in response to a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request for documents associated with the FAB indicates that the American Bankers Association and
counsel for a group of retirement plan services providers requested the DOL to issue guidance fa-
vorable to directed trustees, drafted suggested guidance, and met with members of the Department,
including Secretary Chao and Assistant Secretary for Employee Benefits Security Administration
Ann Combs. This material is on file with author Dana M. Muir. The FOIA request was made by
Lynn L. Sarko, Keller Rohrback, L.L.P. The DOL provided 82 pages of documents in response to
the FOIA request, Letter from Sharon S. Watson, Director, Office of Participant Assistance, Em-
ployee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor, to Lynn L. Sarko, Esq., Keller
Rohrback, L.L.P. (May 6, 2005) (on file with author Dana M. Muir), and withheld 758 pages under
exemption 5. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (exempting from disclosure "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency").
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enable the law to incorporate the insights of the finance literature as that
literature continues to mature. It also would recognize that investment pru-
dence requires more than ensuring a security is traded at an efficient price.
Directed trustees may argue that the size and complexity of today's
benefit plans would require them to accept too much risk under the "ought
to know" or "reason to suspect" standards, but reasonable alternatives exist.
No entity is forced to act as an ERISA trustee. An entity may remain active
in the plan business but act only as a custodian without any discretionary
authority, and thus without fiduciary status. By accepting directed-trustee
status but seeking to avoid historic fiduciary obligations, directed trustees
seek the best of both worlds-the higher fees and trust of plan participants
that presumably come with directed-trustee status, along with limited fidu-
ciary liability. As an alternative to limiting its actions to that of a custodian,
an entity acting as a directed trustee may engage an independent fiduciary to
review directions regarding plan assets. So long as the directed trustee meets
the usual ERISA standards for delegation of fiduciary duties, which require
due care in the selection and oversight of the independent fiduciary, the
directed trustee should be permitted to rely on the decisions of the inde-
pendent fiduciary.
From a larger systemic perspective one might argue that the DOL was
correct in protecting directed trustees from any duty of inquiry regarding the
prudence of investment directions except in the rarest of circumstances. Af-
ter all, depending on one's view of the general prudence of employer stock,
one might expect that those directions rarely would order the directed trus-
tee to make imprudent investments. The litigation costs that result from
claims against directed trustees can be expected to be substantial, as those
cases are likely to require extensive analyses of market efficiency and
whether the directed trustee was in a position to make a valid call of impru-
dence. Alternatively, directed trustees will settle those suits, as they have in
cases such as Enron and WorldCom.
Either way, the costs directed trustees can be expected to face, and ulti-
mately pass along to employees who participate in 401(k) plans and ESOPs,
likely will be substantial. Those who accept the low likelihood of problem-
atic investment directions, the difficulties directed trustees would have in
identifying imprudent directions, and the costs of establishing and enforcing
reasonable behavior through litigation, may decide it is sensible from a pub-
lic policy standpoint to insulate directed trustees from the duty to ensure
investment directions are prudent. But the process for developing the appro-
priate protective standards should be transparent and any use of academic
theory should consider the robustness of the theory as well as its context.
d. The Link to SOX
Whether one looks at SOX, state corporate law, or company-sponsored
employee investment plans, the availability of sufficient and accurate
262. Muir & Schipani, supra note 3, at 467.
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information is critical to securities pricing. The same corporate scandals that
resulted in the enactment of SOX-Enron, WorldCom, and so many oth-
ers-also were among the situations that led to employees losing vast
amounts of assets in their retirement accounts. It should be no surprise that
those employees have sought to hold liable the fiduciaries, who according to
federal law are responsible for ensuring the prudence of both the plans' in-
vestment alternatives and the companies' use of employer stock in making
their plan contributions. These claims have counterparts in most instances to
fraud claims made by general investors under the federal securities laws.
Here we not only consider those general issues, we also look at the use
of finance theory, focusing primarily on the EMH, in establishing regulatory
policies intended to address the sufficiency and reliability of information
flows to the market. Commentators have alleged that in seeking through
SOX to enhance the reliability of corporate disclosure Congress failed to
consider the empirical finance literature. The argument is that as a result
SOX establishes a costly and ineffective regulatory regime. In comparison,
the DOL purported to rely heavily on the EMH in establishing broad protec-
tions for directed trustees. Although that protection may be institutionally
efficient, it does not conform to the fiduciary obligations established by
statute. The DOL's rationale fails to recognize the scholarly debate on the
robustness of the EMH and the situations where, even assuming significant
robustness of the EMH, the market for publicly traded securities may not be
efficient. The exceptions it establishes are unduly narrow and do not clearly
support the EMH rationale. And, setting aside the issues with the EMH, the
DOL does not explain why the efficient pricing of an asset necessarily
means the purchase is prudent for a retirement portfolio.
CONCLUSION
SOX was enacted in 2002 in response to the corporate scandals wreak-
ing havoc on the capital markets.z6 The legislation was intended to help
restore the faith of the investing public through enhanced disclosure re-
263. Senator Sarbanes explained its object:
Our markets, which have the reputation of being the fairest, the most efficient, the most trans-
parent in the world, have suffered greatly in recent times, so much so that they seem to have
lost the confidence of our investors. It is our purpose, with this legislation and through other
actions that will have to be taken by the regulatory agencies and by the private sector, to see
that once again our capital markets deserve the enviable reputation for fairness, efficiency, and
transparency that they have enjoyed through the years.
148 CONG. REC. S7350, S7352 (2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). The President of the United
States, George W. Bush, has also remarked:
America's system of free enterprise, with all its risk and all its rewards, is a strength of our
country and a model for the world. Yet, free markets are not a jungle in which only the un-
scrupulous survive or a financial free-for-all guided only by greed. The fundamentals of a free
market--buying and selling, saving and investing-require clear rules and confidence in basic
fairness.
Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1319, 1320 (July 30, 2002).
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Jun 207 2eyn6OX17quirements. 6 4 Implicitly, the legislators seem to have recognized that the
markets cannot operate efficiently if corporate officials withhold informa-
tion and perpetrate fraud.
Like the legislators adopting SOX, there seems to be implicit recogni-
tion by the Delaware legislators and courts that markets can only work when
accurate information is forthcoming. Where transactions present conflicts of
interest, which in turn may cause information to be withheld from the mar-
kets or relevant parties, Delaware corporate law is quick to scrutinize the
transactions closely for fairness.
The statutory appraisal cases in Delaware illustrate this point. Where the
minority shareholders are frozen out for cash, they are not given the oppor-
tunity to reap the benefits of the new enterprise with the majority
shareholders. In these circumstances, the minority shareholders are provided
the right, by statute, to a judicial determination of the fair value of their266
shares. This is true even when the shares the minority shareholders are
forced to surrender were traded, prior to the transaction, on a national ex-
change. 26 This situation presents serious concerns that the majority
shareholders, due to the inherent conflict of interest, may be withholding
information from the markets, and the market price may thus not reflect fair
value. The courts then utilize financial models acceptable in the financial
268
community to determine fair price, providing a check on the market.
The DOL and company-stock cases take a different approach. The DOL
has stated that directed trustees have no duty of inquiry regarding transac-
tions in publicly traded securities except in three specified and very limited
situations. According to the DOL, federal fiduciary and securities regulation
ensure the sufficiency and accuracy of information flows to the capital mar-
kets. According to the EMH, those markets efficiently incorporate that
information. The DOL then purports to rely on the EMH to relieve directed
trustees of any duty of inquiry regarding the prudence of investment direc-
tions except in specified, narrow situations. The DOL's position relies on the
EMH and other federal regulation to deregulate directed trustees.
This deregulation, however, depends on the robustness of other federal
regulation and the EMH to exempt directed trustees from their fiduciary
obligation of prudence. In doing so, the deregulation ignores the scholarly
controversy over the robustness of the EMH. It ignores the possibility that
specific stocks may trade in inefficient markets. And it ignores the obvious
point from modern portfolio theory-the purchase of a security at an
264. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-205, at 32-33 (2002) ("Only if the investing public believes
that the information available to them is fair, accurate, and transparent can they have confidence in
the integrity of the financial markets and the investment professionals who serve them."); Robin
Phelan et al., ABI Roundtable Discussion: Remember When-Recollections of a Time When Aggres-
sive Accounting, Special Purpose Vehicles, Asset Light Companies and Executive Stock Options
Were Positive Attributes, 1 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 39 (2003).
265. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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efficient price does not necessarily mean that the purchase is prudent for a
retirement portfolio.
